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INTERNATIONAL ENERGY TRANSACTIONS: THE
ROLE OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION




United States energy trade today, in both oil and natural gas, has a
significant international component.1 Many producers of oil are Arab
countries which, historically, have adhered to a trade boycott of Israel.
Libya, another major energy producer, has been identified with interna-
tional terrorism.
A U.S. company or citizen engaging in an international energy trans-
action must not find itself in violation of U.S. law if trading with one of
these countries. Similarly, a U.S. company or citizen anxious to do business
(or to be competitive with a non-U.S. company) in a foreign country may
not engage in a trade practice which may be commonplace in that country:
bribery of government officials to obtain or retain business.
This paper briefly discusses two statutes: the Export Administration
Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and their role in international
energy transactions.
* Mr. Mogel is a partner with Morley Caskin, a Washington, D.C. law firm. He is also Editor-in-
Chief of the ENERGY LAw JouRNA. This article was presented at the International Energy Law
Symposium at The University of TUlsa College of Law, Spring 1993.
1. Natural gas imports during the first 9 months of 1992 were 23% higher than the comparable
period in 1991. During the same period, natural gas exports to Canada and Mexico increased by 32%.
INSIDE F.E.R.C. (Jan. 4, 1993); In addition, at the end of 1992, two California distribution companies
entered into a new natural gas project called "Project Vecinos" to serve new electric generation in Baja,
California (Mexico). Id
With regard to oil, the ratio of domestic supply to consumption is about 45%.
Domestic Consumption Domestic Production
1990:17.0 mbd 1990: 9.0 mbd
1991: 16.7 mbd 1991: 9.2 mbd
1992: 17.0 mbd 1992: 9.0 mbd
1993: 17.2 mbd 1993: 8.8 mbd
Washington Analysis, OIL MARKET UPDATE, Nov. 4, 1993, at 8.
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II. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION Act OF 1969
Since at least 1949, it has been the public policy and law of the United
States to bar export trade with countries that boycott or "blacklist" other
countries friendly to this Nation.2 The Export Administration Act of 19693
in section 2402(5) states that it is the law of the United States:
(A) to oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by
foreign countries against other countries friendly to the United States... ;
(B) to encourage and, in specified cases, require United States persons
engaged in the export of goods or technology or other information to refuse
to take actions, including furnishing information or entering into or imple-
menting agreements, which have the effect of furthering or supporting the
restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by any foreign
country against a country friendly to the United States.
The President delegated his responsibilities under the Act to the Secretary
of Commerce4 who has promulgated implementing regulations.5
Section 2402(b)(1) of the Act provides that in "administering export
controls" the following criteria "shall be taken into account":
(A) the extent to which the country's policies are adverse to the national
security interests of the United States;
(B) the country's Communist or non-Communist status;
(C) the present and potential relationship of the country with the United
States;
(D) The present and potential relationships of the country with countries
friendly or hostile to the United States;
(E) The country's nuclear weapons capability and the country's compliance
record with respect to multilateral nuclear weapons agreements to which the
United States is a party; and
(F) such other factors as the President considers appropriate.
In addition, section 24050)(1) of the Act precludes the issuance of an
export license if the government of such country has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism.
Section 2407(a)(1) of the Act specifically deals with foreign boycotts:
[T]he President shall issue regulations prohibiting any United States person,
with respect to his activities in the interstate or foreign commerce of the
United States, from taking or knowingly agreeing to take any of the following
actions with intent to comply with, further, or support any boycott fostered or
imposed by a foreign country against a country which is friendly to the United
States and which is not itself the object of any form of boycott pursuant to
United States law or regulation:
2. See The Export Control Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (1949). Pub. L. No. 91-105,
§ 1, 83 Stat. 169, provided for termination date of sections 2021-2032 of this appendix on Dec. 31, 1969.
3. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (Supp. 1991).
4. Exec. Order No. 11,533, 3 C.F.R. 533 (1971-1975), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1988).
An Export Administration Review Board also was established by the Act as the successor to the
Export Control Review Board.
5. 18 C.F.R. § 369.1 (1993) reaffirms that the United States policy is to oppose restrictive trade




(A) Refusing, or requiring any other person to refuse, to do business
with or in the boycotted country...
(D) Furnishing information about whether any person has, has had, or
proposes to have any business relationship ... with or in the boycotted
country...
(E) Furnishing information about whether any person is a member of,
has made contributions to, or is otherwise associated with or involved in
the activities of any charitable or fraternal organization which supports
the boycotted country.
(F) Paying, honoring, confirming, or otherwise implementing a letter of
credit which contains any condition or requirement compliance with
which is prohibited by regulations issued pursuant to this paragraph.
The following case law illustrates issues that have arisen under the
anti-boycott provision of the Act. In Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Balridge,6
the court of appeals rejected a contention that companies had been denied
their First Amendment rights when, pursuant to the Export Administration
Act, they were barred from answering a questionnaire prepared by Arab
countries. The questionnaire sought information as to the companies' rela-
tionship with Israel, Israeli firms, and other entities that did business with
Israel. In deciding, the court was aware that Arabs had "blacklisted" com-
panies that failed to return completed questionnaires.
However, the New York District Court in Antco Shipping Co. Ltd. v.
Sidermar, held that there was no violation of the Act in connection with a
contract for the ocean carriage of crude oil between Libya and Freeport,
Bahamas, even though the contract stated in part: "Loading one (1) or two
(2) safe port(s) Mediterranean Sea, excluding IsraeL"7 Notwithstanding
this explicit language, the court concluded "[tihis is a contract between an
Italian shipowner and a Bahamian charterer for the ocean carriage of
cargos from Mediterranean ports to Caribbean or.. . American ports, in
which event the contract would give rise to imports, not exports,... [to] the
United States."8 In sum, the Export Administration Act, is an unequivocal
expression of national policy,9 which has been primarily applied in connec-
tion with the Arab boycott of Israel.
6. 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984) cert. denied 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
7. 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(emphasis added).
8. Id. at 213. Compare Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 581 F. Supp. 1570 (D. Tex. 1984)
which held that a medical school that excluded Jewish physicians from participating in cardiovascular
surgical teams sent to Saudi Arabia violated the Export Administration Act.
9. A criminal investigation by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange
Commission was initiated because of allegations that an international hospital supply company paid a
$2.2 million bribe to get off the Arab boycott list by: (1) waiving a debt of a Saudi company; (2) selling a
plant in Israel and building a similar one in Syria; and (3) writing a letter to the Syrian Army official
stating that it had "no present intention to make new investments in Israel or to sell new technology to
Israeli companies." Thomas M. Burton, Baxter Fails to Quell Questions on Its Role in the Israeli Boycott,
WALL ST. J., April 25, 1991, at Al.
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III. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) became law on
December 20, 197710 as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.11 Stated simply, the FCPA makes it illegal for any "domestic con-
cern""2 to bribe a "foreign official" 3 for the purpose of obtaining or retain-
ing business.1
4
The legislative history of the FCPA was discussed in Lamb v. Phillip
Morris, Inc. :15
[T]he FCPA was designed with the assistance of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to aid federal law enforcement agencies in curbing bribes
of foreign officials. According to the Senate report regarding the FCPA, the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs initially "ordered
reported a bill, S. 3664, which incorporated the SEC's recommendations and a
direct prohibition against the payment of overseas bribes by any U.S. business
concern." ... As the Senate report indicates, the resulting enactment of the
FCPA represents a legislative endeavor to promote confidence in interna-
tional trading Yelatuships and domestic makets;... the authorizati on of
:stringent criminal penalties amplifies the foreign policy and law enforcement
considerations underlying the FCPA .... The House Conference report refers
to the "jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties" of broadening
the FCPA's reach.... thereby addressing concerns typically of special interest
to law enforcement officials. In light of these comments and the general tenor
of the FCPA itself, which requires the Attorney General to participate
actively in encouraging and supervising compliance with the Act, see, e.g., 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), 78dd-2(f), we find that the FCPA was primarily designed
to protect the integrity of American foreign policy and domestic markets
(footnotes omitted).
Implementing this congressional intent, section 77dd-1 of the FCPA
makes it unlawful for an officer, director, employee, agent or stockholder
of a company registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 to use
the mail or other "instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in fur-
therance of an offer, payment, [or] promise to pay.., of any money or
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. 1992).
11. In 1988, the FCPA was reenacted and amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-418, §§ 5003(a), 5003(c), 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-24 (1988) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (Supp. 1992)).
12. Section 78dd-2(h)(1) broadly defines a "domestic concern" to include, inter alia, a resident of
the United States or any business entity which has its principal place of business in the United States.
13. "Foreign official" is defined as any officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency or instrumentality thereof; or any person acting in an official capacity for or on
behaU of any suh government oy depameiu, ageny m iw itntva .iy. IS U.S.C. % 7ind4f). in
determining whether a member of a royal family, a member of a legislative body, or an official of a
state-owned business enterprise would be considered a "foreign official," one should utilize the
Department of Justice's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure.
14. Cf. Royal Decree No, 38, 22 Shaward 1377 (May 11, 1958) (Saudi Arabia has imposed strict
bribery laws and regulations for combatting bribery).
15. 915 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (6th Cir. 1990).
16. A company charged with violating the FCPA was alleged to have given a Syrian official an
autographed picture of Joan Collins to add to his photo collection of American starlets and models.
Burton, supra note 9.
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anything of value"17 to any foreign official, any foreign political party, or
official or candidate for foreign political office for the purpose of:
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official
capacity, or (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in
violation of the lawful duty of such official, or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign govern-
ment or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of
such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in obtaining
or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.
The FCPA also makes it unlawful to make payments through an intermedi-
ary, knowing that all or some of the payment will go directly or indirectly
to influence a foreign official" in order to obtain or to retain business. The
term "knowing includes a conscious disregard and deliberate ignorance."19
There is a major exception to the prohibitions of the FCPA as well as
several affirmative defenses to a violation of one of its provisions. First,
there is an exception for "grease payments" made to "expedite or to secure
the performance of a routine governmental action."20 A routine govern-
mental action includes: obtaining permits, licenses, or other official docu-
ments to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; processing
governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; providing police pro-
tection, mail pick-up and delivery, scheduling inspections associated with
contract performance or inspections relating to transit of goods across
country; providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and
unloading of cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from
deterioration.2' However, the FCPA makes it clear that "routine govern-
ment action" does not include:
any decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award new
business to or to continue business with a particular party, or any action taken
by a foreign official involved in the decision-making process to encourage a
17. Section 78dd-2(h)(1) makes clear that the FCPA applies to "any domestic concern" even if not
subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (emphasis added):
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and
(B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in
the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3) (Supp. 1992).
19. Arthur Aronoff, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, BusINEss AMEraCA,
February 11, 1991, at 10, 11. "There are no cases explaining what 'knowing,' 'conscious disregard, or
'deliberate ignorance' mean in the context of the FCPA. As such, it is unclear whether and to what
extent there is a duty of diligent inquiry into any suspicious details concerning arrangements with an
intermediary." Id
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (Supp. 1992) states:
Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any facilitating or expediting payment to a
foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure
the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party
official.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(3)(A) (Supp. 1992).
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decision to award new business to or continue business with a particular
party.22
The FCPA also provides for affirmative defenses to a charge of violat-
ing one of its provisions. These are set forth in section 78dd-2(c) as follows:
(1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made,
was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official's,
- political party's, party official's, or candidate's country; or
(2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made,
was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging
expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party official, or
candidate and was directly related to:
(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or serv-
ices; or
(B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign govern-
ment or agency thereof.23
The FCPA provides for both civil and criminal penalties.' A business
entity may be fined up to two million dollars. Equally significant, an
officer, director, employee, agent, or even a stockholder may be fined up to
$100,000 and/or receive a five-year prison sentence.25
The record keeping provisions of the FCPA provide that affected com-
panies keep books that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect
the issuer's transactions.26 Companies that make "grease payments" are
required to list the payments and the amounts. Those companies regis-
tered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are also required to main-
tain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurance that (1) transactions are executed according to the
management's general or specific authorization; (2) transactions are
recorded so that financial statements will be prepared according to gener-
ally accepted accounting principles; (3) access to assets is allowed only
according to management's authorization; and (4) recorded accountability
for assets is compared with existing assets at reasonable intervals.
In United States v. Liebo,27 the court upheld a conviction under the
FCPA. Liebo was vice-president of a company that sold military equip-
ment and supplies throughout the world. In June 1983, the company
became a prime contractor on a maintenance contract entered into by the
Niger government and a German company. Liebo agreed to make "ges-
22. I § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B) (Supp. 1992).
23. It is often difficult to determine whether a payment was lawful under the written laws of the
foreign country. Additionally, because it is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the
defendant to show that the payment met the statutory requirements. TMas, the prosecution bears no
burden of demonstrating that such payments did not fall within the scope of the permissible provisions.
Aronoff, supra note 19, at 10.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp. 1992).
25. A person or firm found in violation of the FCPA may be barred from doing business with the
federal government. Indictment alone can lead to suspension of the right to do business with the
government. Furthermore, a person or firm found guilty of violating the FCPA may be ruled ineligible
to receive export licenses.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. 1992).
27. 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Or. 1991).
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tures" to the chief of maintenance of the Niger Air Force (Tiemogo). The
maintenance contract then was approved by Niger's President. Liebo
made subsequent "gestures" to Tiemogo by establishing a U.S. bank
account for Tiemogo and by having his company, NAPCO, deposit
$130,000 to that account. Thereafter, NAPCO was awarded two additional
Niger contracts, valued in excess of $2,500,000. Liebo then purchased air-
line tickets for Tiemogo's cousin, who was the first consular for the Niger
Embassy in Washington, D.C. Inexplicably, the jury acquitted Liebo of all
charges relating to the "gestures" made to Tiemogo.2 However, he was
convicted in connection with the airline tickets because they were found to
have been made "to obtain or retain business."
In United States v. McLean,29 the court of appeals held, under the ear-
lier version of the FCPA,3 ° that an employee could not be prosecuted for a
substantive offense under the FCPA if his employer had not or could not
be convicted of violating the FCPA. The defendant, a vice president of a
supplier of compressor equipment to PEMEX, the national petroleum
company of Mexico, was charged with bribing PEMEX officials. Although
the defendant was conceded to have committed acts within the scope of his
employment, his employer was not charged in the indictment. Relying on
the Eckhart Amendment, which required as a condition precedent, a con-
viction of an employer, McLean concluded that an employee could not be
convicted. 31
Finally, in Citicorp Int'l Trading Co., Inc. v. Western Oil & Ref. Co.,
Inc.,32 the court addressed the issue of whether the FCPA provides for a
private right of action. In Citicorp, private litigants, the Zanders,
attempted to recover under the FCPA from Citicorp. Citicorp had entered
into an agreement with Western Oil to act as the company's exclusive agent
and to provide letters of credit in connection with a transaction that West-
ern Oil was negotiating with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC) for the export of oil from Nigeria.
The dispute arose when the deal between Western Oil and NNPC fell
through, allegedly as a result of Citicorp's failure to provide acceptable let-
ters of credit; Citicorp had attempted to bribe NNPC. The Zanders alleged
that because they were parties to the agreement between Citicorp and
Western Oil, they should be able to recover under the FCPA. The court
disagreed, however, because it found that no private right of action existed
under the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. The four-part test established by
28. The payments made by NAPCO (and approved by its president) were to "commission agents"
who were intermediaries of iemogo. In order to obtain financing, Liebo had certified that "no rebates,
gifts or gratitudes have been given contrary to United States law to officers, officials, or employees of
the Niger government." Id. at 1310.
29. 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1984).
30. Under current law, there is no longer a condition precedent that a company have violated the
FCPA in order to convict an employee or agent. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp. 1992).
31. 738 F.2d at 657. The Eckhart Amendment is no longer in effect.
32. 771 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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the Supreme Court that determines whether a statute implies a private
right of action was not met. 3
IV. CONCLUSION
International energy transactions raise numerous business, financing, 3
legal and public policy issues. In contemplating such a transaction, a U.S.
entity must consider whether it would be in violation of U.S. Laws, such as
the Export Administration Act of 1969 or the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.3 5
The Export Administration Act has been most often applied in con-
nection with Israel and has produced varied results in the courts. The For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, while allowing "grease payments" to expedite
routine governmental action, prohibits bribery directly or through an
intermediary.
For many U.S. businesses there remains pressure, particularly in this
uncertain economic period, "to get the deal done." This pressure is often
coupled with foreign customs which make bribery a way of life and foreign
competitors who are not restricted by our laws. Consequently, the best
advice is strict adherence to the rules of U.S. law.3
6
33. Id The relevant factors to be considered are whether: 1) The plaintiff is a member of the
class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; 2) The legislative history indicates an intent,
either explicitly or implicitly, to create or deny such a private remedy; 3) The creation of a private right
of action is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislation; and 4) The cause of action is one
traditionally relegated to state law so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law.
"The refusal of courts to imply a private right of action has been uoiform." Id. at 606, (citing Lamb
v. Phillip Morris Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990); McLean v. Int'l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214 (5th
Cir. 1987); Shields ex rel. Sundstrand Corp. v. Erickson, 710 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Lewis v.
Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1985)).
However, "conduct that violates the antibribery provisions of the FCPA may give rise to a private
cause of action for treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) or to actions under other federal or state laws." FRAUD SECnON, U.S. DEPr. OF JUSTIcE,
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACnCEs ACT, ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS (Feb. 1992). For example, "an action
might be brought under RICO by a competitor who alleges that the bribery caused the defendant to
win a foreign contract." Id
34. See Mogel & Haslach, OPEC: A Success Story for Business and Government, EXPORT TODAY
28 (Sept. 1991).
35. For governmental assistance in determining whether FCPA applies to a company, see FRAUD
SECTION, U.S. DEPr. OF JusTIciE, supra note 33.
36. For further assistance, any party may request a statement of the Justice Department's present
enforcement intentions under the antibribery provisions of the FCPA regarding any proposed business
conduct. See 28 C.F.R. j 80 (1992). The Attorney General is required to issue an opinion in response
to a specific inquiry from a person or firm within thirty days of the request. Id.
